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If there is one thing that homeopathy seems to be short of, it is civilised debate. Causation, Time and Progression in Homeopathy, Little's considered counter-point to my two articles on causation in the treatment of chronic illness is an important contribution, however, to creating such a debate. His evident love for homeopathy and his own careful insights make such a debate possible. Homeopaths need to engage in a more open discussion and examination of the basis of homeopathic medicine if it is to continue to be relevant to the healing of people suffering from dis-ease. |
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However, Little's otherwise careful counter-point suffers from the same weakness as that of many other criticisms of departures from homeopathy as currently taught and practiced by many in North America. These departures violate the "received wisdom" and are, thus, not homeopathy. This ignores the clinical evidence and rejects something on a prior grounds. It is a circular argument. It ignores that what is currently believed to be homeopathy is subject to change. This is bad science, for it closes off further inquiry and discovery. It makes homeopathy more akin to religion, where anything new is checked against a sacred text for consistency. Then dissent becomes heresy, which is not conducive to open inquiry and advancement of knowledge.
Science, in its most complete sense as that branch of human thought called "natural philosophy," is the art of systematic inquiry into the natural world in order to make sense of it. Science is based at any given time on certain presumptions and laws, but it must be ever ready to accept that these presumptions are only a partial understanding. Imagine for a moment that Hahnemann had died prior to having written his opus on chronic disease and prior to having discovered the greater efficacy of liquid doses. Then imagine that someone else, based on close observations, had proposed a theory of acquired predispositions. What would the reception to the idea have been? For most it would likely have been to reject the idea as not being consistent with Hahnemann's latest teachings and, therefore, not consistent with homeopathy. You might have argued that Hahnemann had experimented with these new ideas and had even written about them in his private papers, but in vain. You would likely have been answered with the argument that these experiments amount to nothing because Hahnemann chose not to incorporate them into his official work, the Organon, and thus that he felt they did not merit further consideration. How much the poorer we would have been, not because Hahnemann died early, but because of the same mind-set which would have turned these last official words into dogma. What is Homeopathy? Homeopathy is at its base a system of medicine which matches the energy state of the patient with the similar energy state of a substance. The only thing that approaches a law of nature in homeopathy is this principle of similars. Hahnemann called it a law, but it was not intended by Hahnemann to be taken as a law of nature in the way that gravity is (this is the reason for the use of the term "curentur" in "similia similibus curentur" instead of the phrasing "curantur" which is more determinative in Latin). The other things that we are used to considering as basic principles the minimum dose, the provings, individualization, the single remedy are just that, principles, and as such subject to challenge and change in the light of observation and experience. If a homeopathic remedy is given and it seems to improve the state of health, then we must accept, if the law of similars is universal, that the remedy acted homeopathically. We may argue with the method on one ground or another, but we cannot argue with the facts, the clinical evidence. We cannot, as did some who refused to look into Galileo's telescope, pretend that the facts don't exist. Let's look at the criticisms leveled against ST. The first is that it over-emphasizes causation. It is true that it gives, in chronic illness, causation a more central role than symptomology. But this is based on clinical evidence. It does not mean that ST ignores symptomology. Little argues that cause, symptoms and constitution must be considered in their totality in any given case. I agree. It does not follow however, as Little seems to imply , that the emphasis on cause in the analysis and treatment of one aspect of the case, chronic illness, is misguided. This emphasis is based on fact. The second criticism is that ST advocates the "routine use of remedies by a one-sided view of causation." Clinical evidence strongly supports that the treatment of causation, to be curative, must use remedies that have a special relationship to past, unresolved causes. This does not mean that only these remedies can be used, but that they are effective in most cases. That is a fact. Little only objects to them on the grounds that the use of remedies so routinely will cause homeopathy to "fall into routinism." Once an "ism" is used, we are dealing more with ideology than fact. No one seems to think that the use of the "genus epidemicus" is routine and will cause the dreaded disease within homeopathy. Is this because Hahnemann sanctioned the exception? Is it inconceivable that, based on the evidence, their exists a "genus etiologicus?" Can time have the same de-individualising effect as an epidemic disturbance? It should not be dismissed a priori. ST does not suggest that everyone needs only one remedy for a certain shock or trauma, as Little states, but that one remedy is more often than not the remedy needed, unless symptoms in any individual case clearly point out otherwise. The third criticism is that ST uses more than one remedy at a time. Little claims that this is done on the basis that a single remedy will not work or that a strong aggravation will result. ST does use more than one remedy at a time when more than one type of cause is involved at a time. This is based on clinical evidence. Little argues that there are thousands of cases that suggest that the use of one remedy works. This does not negate the cases where a single remedy has not worked, and one or more remedies prescribed on cause have. ST does not claim that the use of only one remedy results in strong aggravation, but only that if there is more than one cause, to treat for only one will result in the vital force bringing to the forefront the struggle with the other blockages to cure. This manifests in symptoms which resemble an aggravation and can be resolved by giving the remedy for the cause involved (as indicated by the symptoms thrown up by the vital force in the struggle). Little also defends the principle of the single remedy on the grounds that to give more than one is to "confuse" the vital force and will lead to suppression, antagonistic secondary reactions and prolonged aggravations. I can only say that the clinical experience does not support this. I have had many cases where the administration of more than one remedy, determined by the causes involved at any given time, resulted in a speedy improvement of the case without any of the reactions mentioned. Either they should happen all the time, or the objection is purely theoretical. The fourth criticism is that ST uses high potencies and injudiciously. If there is "little faith in the power of the single dose" as Little states for ST, it is because of the clinical evidence that suggests strongly that true cure can only be achieved in many complex, chronic cases by repeated doses high. The basis for this is found also in the homeopathic literature as my book sets out. Constitutional prescribing does not, in my experience and that of Dr. Elmiger and others, remove the cause, only the symptoms, where the cause is significant. If this is the case for serious, complex cases where the failure is clear for all to see, then it must also hold true for those cases where the cause remains "hidden" because it does not produce any current symptoms or signs of its existence. Little also criticises ST for producing prolonged aggravations. This charge can equally be leveled against many cases in the homeopathic literature, past and present. Little's discussion here does not seem to distinguish between the "homeopathic aggravation" and the "healing reaction," which negates much of the argument related to primary (aggravation) and secondary (healing) action which he uses to dismiss ST claims here and elsewhere. Where ST claims a healing reaction, it concerns the secondary reaction, not the primary. He further does not seem to recognise that a remedy cannot act in a proving if there is no predisposition or latent susceptibility in the person. If this were not the case, we would all react the same to a remedy in a proving, which is not the case. Also, if provings on the healthy produce harmful or negative symptoms, then we should cease conducting them. Homeopaths record the contrary, where the potency has been dynamic in nature (highly diluted). The issue of provings is important, because Little's views on them form the basis for the criticism that ST produces unnecessary aggravations, where more traditional homeopathy is gentle. I should also point out that in ST the use of medicinal (liquid) centesimal potencies are used by me and others currently practicing ST to adjust for dose much in the same manner as advocated by Hahnemann. The fifth criticism is that the treatment for miasms in a fixed sequence is unfounded. The arguments are theoretical, rejecting ST's "assumptions." ST's treatment protocol is not fixed by any means, but it is based on extensive clinical evidence. Part of Little's argument against it is based on the rejection of ST's claim that a healing reaction to a miasmic nosode is evidence that it was needed. This argument claims that the ST healing reaction is the primary effect of the remedy, a misconception, as noted above. Summary I have taken Little's useful summary and provide what I feel is a more accurate version (without the rather value-loaded terms he uses when describing ST, such as "routinism," "polypharmacy," "radical," "provokes")
In summary, what Little's otherwise erudite and considered criticism points up is the still profound misunderstanding of the new world-view of chronic disease that ST is based on. Much of this dialogue reminds me of a Newtonian physicist talking to a Quantum physicist. The points of reference are very different, although they are both talking about the same universe. I hope that this debate does, nonetheless, lead to an eventual understanding of the profound insights offered by looking at chronic illness through a causal lens, not a primarily symptomological one. We have to start somewhere and this electronic medium is a good place to start. |
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